































Signification is a social practice which produces and reproduces 
meanings, the result of that being the sign (signum facere), ar-
tificial semantic differences constructed by predicative subjects 
of a cultural formation. In order for the designer to be able to 
formulate relevant design solutions, he/she has to reject what 
is considered already known, as well as a prioristic premises, 
dichotomized positions and reductive definitions. That will allow 
him/her to think creatively about his/her practical problems. 
Innovative solutions do not follow the excludent philosophy of 
either/or but adopt instead the inclusiveness of this and that, 
something that seems to explain the closeness of contemporary 
design philosophies to Peirce’s semiotics, which is what this 
paper aims to show.
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Significação e design
   Flávio Vinícius Cauduro
Peirce used to say that a prioristic, axiomatic definitions  are 
of little help in confronting experience, since material feelings, 
things and events cannot be categorized in pigeon-holes and 
arranged in a coherent, rigid, permanent, philosophical structure 
once and forever. For, according to his triadic semiotic method, 
everything is capable of being connected with everything else; 
and because, according to his philosophical beliefs, the universe 
is always changing.          
When elaborating on semiosis, from the psychologists’s 
viewpoint, which he referred to as that of “association of ideas”, 
Peirce stressed the main ways by which he saw signification 
proceeding. He wrote:   
The association of ideas is said to proceed according to three prin-
ciples — those of resemblance, of contiguity, and of causality. But 
it would be equally true to say that signs denote what they do on 
the three principles of resemblance, contiguity, and causality. There 
can be no question that anything is a sign of whatever is associated 
with it by resemblance, by contiguity, or by causality: nor can there 
be any doubt that any sign recalls the thing signified. So, then, the 
association of ideas consists in this, that a judgement occasions 
another judgement, of which it is the sign. Now this is nothing less 
nor more than inference.” (PEIRCE, 1955,  p. 245-246, my italics)
       
Peirce saw association of ideas as resulting from the action of 
“a gentle force which commonly prevails” (PEIRCE, 1931-1958, 
v. 7, p 250), which we notice most obviously in “suggestions” (that 
is, generic inferences) based, as he wrote later on, in resemblance 
and contiguity (PEIRCE, 1931-1958, v.7, p. 250-251). Peirce 
sometimes also employed the word causality in his writings, and 
he had initially postulated it as being a third way of associating 
ideas (c.1868). But subsequently he refer to causality as symbo-
lism, and concentrated most of his attention to contiguity and 
similarity. Thus, as Peirce put it later on:
Suggestions of these two kinds [resemblance and contiguity] 
characterize not merely dreams and dreamy meditations, but 
also thoughts referred to the real world, or in technical language 
categorical judgements. Association is the only force which exists 
within the intellect, and whatever power of controlling the thoughts 
there may be can be exercised only by utilizing these forces ... These 
unconscious and uncontrolled reasonings hardly merit that name; 
although they are very often truer than if they were regulated by 
an imperfect logic, showing in this the usual superiority of instinct 
over reason, and of practice over theory. They take place like other 
mental suggestions according to the two principles of similarity 
and connection in experience. (PEIRCE, 1931-1958, v.7, p. 276)
   
He also seem to have figured out symbolic signs as being equi-
valent to typical classes or circles, which could change their place, 
as well as their interconnections, in a dynamic mental network, 
or system of ideas. For Peirce also envisaged, like Saussure, the 
existence of a complex system of signs or ideas being activated by 
signification, with the difference that such a system was private 
and dynamic, probably due to the singular plurality of his own 
training and formation (which included, among other scientific 
practices, logic, mathematics, physics and  chemistry). He wrote, 
in that respect: “Suggestion by contiguity  means that when an 
idea is familiar to us as part of a system of ideas, that idea may call 
the system to our minds, and from the system, one of the other 
ideas may, for some reason, detach itself and come to be thought 
of by itself […]” (PEIRCE, 1931-1958, v.7, p. 251, my italics). 
“Suggestion by resemblance is easily enough understood, as 
soon as the conception is once grasped that the similarity of two 
ideas consists in the fact that the mind naturally joins them in 
thought in a certain way […] “ (PEIRCE, 1931-1958, v.7, p. 
251).
“Now, two ideas are compared only in the idea of the class, 
lot, or set to which they belong; and they act alike only in so far 
as they have one and the same relation to that connecting idea 
[....] “ (PEIRCE, 1931-1958, v.7, p. 252, my italics).
“As experience clusters certain ideas into sets, so does the 
mind too....These sets have various forms of connection […]” 
(PEIRCE, 1931-1958,  v.7, p. 252).
[…] by virtue of the occult working of the depths within us,..two 
feelings coalesce into one notion. For the sake of calling this by 
a familiar name, I call this association by similarity. But the ideas 
united by virtue of an occult inward power, are not always regar-
ded as similar. Contraries are also joined. [But] Ideas and feelings 
are so joined which are neither merely declared by the mind to be 
similar nor to be contrary. Such, for instance, are length, breadth, 
and thickness [contiguous concepts] ... In general, what the mind 
pronounces is that the feeling or idea of yesterday and that of 
today belong to one system, of which it forms a conception. A 
concept is not a mere jumble of particulars — that is only its crudest 
species. A concept is the living influence upon us of a diagram, 
or icon, with whose several parts are connected in thought and 
equal number of feelings or ideas. The law of mind is that feelings 
and ideas attach themselves in thought so as to form systems.” 
(PEIRCE, 1931-1958, v.7, p. 283, my italics)
As we know, Peirce’s notion of one’s mental semiotic system 
included not only conventional concepts (symbols) but feelings 
as well (motivated by emotions and experiences). As we recall, 
the most widely known contribution of Peirce to semiotics, his 
classification of signs into the three categories of icons, indices, 
and symbols, are also dependent upon those two basic types of 
motivated associations, similarity and contiguity, plus symbolic 
or conventional associations, which he saw as imputed to the 
subject, either due to repetitive associations prescribed by his/
her community, or acquired by force of a habit, or resulting 
from inborn instinct (PEIRCE, 1955, p. 113). We also recall 
that symbolic or conventional relations are, ultimately, all those 
personal and interpersonal historical relations of contiguity and 
similarity which have become demotivated: one “naturally” 































& Kress have observed, “A dogmatic assertion that signs are all 
and equally “arbitrary” is unjustifiable and unhelpful for general 
semiotics ...the doctrine of the arbitrariness of the sign expresses, 
in a marked form and by negation, the principle of the social 
determination of the sign […]” (HODGE ; KRESS, 1988, p. 
22). And, we should add, the notion of the “arbitrariness of signs” 
also represses the historical, ideological dimension of the process 
which produces them.
It is also possible to infer from Peirce’s writings that both 
identity and opposition were the associative relations, or symbolic 
relationships, activated through symbols. For Peirce also recogni-
zed that to identify something as a sign is necessarily to recognize, 
first of all, what makes it opposed to, or different from other signs, 
that is, what makes it to contrast with other signs, what confers 
on it its “character”. For Peirce also remarked that: 
A thing without oppositions ipso facto  does not exist ... [the con-
ception of being through opposition is] essential to an individual 
thing or subject, but also to an individual fact […] Two drops of 
water retain each its identity and opposition to the other no matter 
in what or in how many respects they are alike […] existence lies in 
opposition merely. (PEIRCE, 1931-1958, v.2,  p. 248-249, my italics)
Therefore,  knowing or identifying something requires oppo-
sing a permanent reaction to it. As he said: “All determination is by 
negation ; we can first recognize any character only by putting an 
object which possesses it into comparison with an object which 
possesses it not […]”  (PEIRCE, 1955, p. 240,  my italics).
“[…] Wherever there is identity there is necessarily otherness; 
and in whatever field there is true otherness there is necessarily 
identity.” (PEIRCE, 1931-1958, v.1, p. 204, my italics).
Peirce tried to account for opposition under the rubric of 
similarity, although he recognized that conjunction of contraries 
is “not always regarded as similar” (PEIRCE,  1931-1958, v.7, p. 
283). His observation makes sense, because we usually compare 
or contrast things with each other in terms of several relevant 
same sensorial dimensions, while assuming other variables cons-
tant or non-relevant to the comparing. On the other hand, we 
do not simply make “neutral” comparisons, for we are always 
evaluating, punctuating the differences we have observed. For 
such comparisons and evaluations involve both our imaginary 
(sensorial images of all kinds) and our symbolic (ideological 
categorizations) dimensions as well, requiring us to take up a 
thetic position for predication: either we situate ourselves on one 
or on the other side of a significant divide (accepting the divide), 
or else we refuse the posited difference (rejecting the divide), 
constructing another one. 































psychoanalysis, Peirce’s semiotics, Lacanian theories, Derrida”s 
différance, and Kristeva”s semanalysis have pointed out, any 
identification or affirmation of identity is an affirmation of a 
being (an ego) which necessarily requires a reaction to it, or its 
negation (a non-ego), that is, a correspondent opposition to itself 
(an otherness) in order for the consciousness of being to be possible. 
To say “I think, therefore I am” is not enough for one to come 
into being, as Peirce insisted all the time, for any “I” requires an 
“other”, a “not-I” to support his/her existence. All predications 
require a predicating subject, a copula (a connective verb) and 
an explicit or implicit predicated object. For any predication 
whatsoever is based upon the simultaneous affirmation of one 
identity and the recognition of another  complementary entity, 
which may or may not be explicitly identified. If the supporting 
or complementary other is not explicitly recognized, it remains 
simply a repressed complement, a generic negation, a “not-X” or 
“nonX”; on the other hand, if its existence is explicitly recognized, 
in the form of a specific “Y” located in the generic territory of 
“not-X”, then  “Y” is said to be the contrary  or the opposite  of 
the term “X” (see COPI 1986, p. 183).
A figure can only exist against a background; every positive 
mark requires a negative support; all action necessitates a sup-
portive reaction; each consciousness requires a complementary 
unconsciousness; every signifier requires an associated signified; 
form begs content, etc. This is what is called complementarity 
or the interdependence of contraries (when the other of the being 
is named).
In symbolic logic, the domains of identity and negation 
or opposition, of the ego and its complementary non-ego or 
other, appear in diagrammatic form as follows (see, for instance, 
ALLWOOD; ANDERSON; DAHL, 1977; and COPI 1986): 
Figure 1 - Complementary signs (A and not-A) and opposite signs 
(A and B)
In the case of the ego which comes into being, A is usually 
seen as the domain of the subject and not-A as the rest of the 
universe. But we can have the reverse situation as well: A, the 































circumference, and not-A, the other, as being inside it.
The division of a whole in two, like in the second diagram in 
the above figure, where not-A is restricted to the domain B, cor-
respond to that situation when not-A is restricted to an explicit, 
restricted area B of the universe, such that A and its complement 
are now seen as opposite parts of a wider class, or set, or field C 
(represented by the whole area delimited by the circumference). 
Such a situation corresponds in logic to a disjunction, which is 
any proposition affirming that “If any S is in C, it is either a A 
or a B”, where S is the subject of the proposition.   
In relation to the first diagram in Figure 1, we could say 
that the first alternative for positioning the ego (A inside the 
circumference vs not-A in the outside of it) means one sees itself 
surrounded by the total environment, and dissociated from it, 
but does not realize any specific correlation to an other. This 
first alternative, it seems to us, could represent the way a specific 
minority sees its-self being oppressed by a powerful, generic, 
faceless majority, that is, by the rest of the sociocultural forma-
tion. It might also represent the way in which some designers 
imagine themselves in relation to their practice, when they feel 
constrained by generic sociocultural forces and demands, by 
overwhelming pressures and demands of the public opinion, 
in an imaginary situation of isolation from it, which could also 
explain why such modernist designers see themselves engaged in 
a titanic, heroic practice of resistance to “their” demands, and in 
a constant struggle to make their own preferences to prevail. In 
such a situation very little dialogue occurs between the designer 
and “the others”, for he/she feels that concessions cannot be 
made, since the space reserved for doing his/her own thing seems 
to be already too restricted. The designer feels as if he/she were 
a marginalized artist or genius whose task were to enlighten the 
rest of his/her “society”.         
The complementary alternative for positioning one-self, 
in that first case (A outside the circumference, not-A inside it) 
corresponds perhaps to an ego seeing its-self as an omnipotent, 
independent “master”, which has not yet realized his dependence 
on a specific “slave”, the other still being a very small complement, 
a nuisance under his control and government. This second alter-
native could correspond to the identification of the ego with an 
imaginary generic majority, whose consensual actions seem to be 
negated by only a small, generic minority of the entire “society”. 
Such situation, in design practice, could correspond perhaps to 
that of overconfident, non-dissenting designers which imagine 
themselves just responding to the generic design needs of their 
“society”, with only a few and sporadic dissenting pockets oppo-































again, little dialogue going on between the designer and others, 
because he/she “already knows” what others want, since they are 
all “like” him/herself. 
In relation to the second diagram in Figure 1, on the other 
hand, we have the situation when both “master” and “slave”, the 
ego and the other, have finally recognized each other by name 
and as interdependent complements of each other. It could cor-
respond to that situation when one realizes that he/she is neither 
part of a majority nor part of a minority, but simply part of a 
wider network of heterogeneous social relations, or of a dynamic 
sociocultural system, which, at any specific moment, is actuali-
zed through oppositional situations, requiring him/her to take 
decisions and make options in dichotomized, confrontational, 
temporary ways. He/she accepts traditional dualistic positions of 
meaning and constantly tries to promote the superiority of his/
her own half-side in any situation. That diagram could be seen as 
representing the “master-slave” dialectic used by Lacan to illus-
trate his ideas of how relations between gender, and other social 
relationships are constructed by the symbolic order for its sub-
jects. That situation could thus correspond to the habitual view of 
design practice as a practice of dynamic, multiple confrontations 
between opposing desires and strategies: designer vs client, client & 
designer vs consumers, designer & consumers vs client, client & 
consumers vs designer, client & designer & consumer vs others 
(ecological groups, religious groups, the media, the government, 
other formations — Apple community vs Microsoft community 
— etc). There is confrontation, or asymmetric dialogue in such 
situations, for one side is usually already in dominance and tries 
to affirm its power over the other side which, of course, tries to 
invert that asymmetry.         
But there is another further alternative for positioning one”s 
ego in that situation, which corresponds to the sudden realization 
by oppositional sides, locked in an impasse or in a never ending 
battle, that they might have a same goal in common which renders 
their former disputes irrelevant. That usually occurs when they 
both realize that they depend on each other”s existence for their 
own survival, that a solidary and dialogical approach could bring 
much more advantages to both parties, and that their struggle 
is not against each other but against hegemonic stereotypes 
which have put them into such an artificial confrontation. The 
appearance of such an alternative could correspond to extreme, 
emergent, dramatic, and pedagogical situations, which make both 
subjects, sides, or parties, suddenly realize that they had been 
taking for granted their “natural” incompatibilities and rivalries 
for too long, that they had repeatedly assumed such positioning 































definitions which informed  it.  
What neither the ego nor the other usually perceive is that 
such oppositional impasses have a history, that they have been 
produced by an initial symbolic split of the domain of being or 
acting of the subject, by an interested, motivated Other which 
remains apparently invisible. But its signs are always already 
there. For instance, in textual as well as mental representations, 
the Other of divisive, non-dialogical ideologies usually takes the 
form of closed lines and closed spaces, which separate and pri-
vilege pertinent “insides” from irrelevant “outsides”, texts from 
their contexts, essences from supplements, form from substance, 
reality from fantasy, reason from emotion, etc, which demarcate 
imaginary, mutually exclusive entities, territories, domains, or 
“patterns” for signification. 
If we are able to realize that all divisions are artificial construc-
tions promoted by material, ideological practices of sociocultural 
formations, then, and only then, can we hope to be able to find 
significant solutions for chronic problems, acting productively 
as conscious social subjects.  For we have to systematically reject 
the taken-for-granted, a priori assumptions, static and immuta-
ble positions, narrow-minded definitions, in order to be able to 
think creatively about any problem. We have to realize that no 
problem should ever be posited in reductionistic, binaristic terms, 
in terms of either this or that. For dichotomized thinking is an 
impoverished, simplistic way of dealing with complex realities. 
Practical situations are much better approached when we  take 
into account both “this” and “that”. 
Then we begin to perceive that the real problem we face is 
altogether different: the basic problem is always how to escape 
from logocentric dichotomies. We should always look for the 
dichotomizing Other and pluralize it, put it into a dynamic 
context, in confrontation with several alternative Others, in 
order to dissolve its monopolistic, repressive, and tyrannical rule. 
The presence of the Other, for instance, in the above diagra-
ms, is represented by a static closed line which, in the first case 
separates an “inside” from an “outside”, and which in the second 
case separates the “left side or hemisphere” from the “right side 
or hemisphere” (as if those two halfs could represent the “whole 
situation”). The logocentric Other, the true master of dualistic 
dialectics, survives through such apparently democratic, balanced 
splitings. For “divide and rule” is the lemma of the oppressive 
Other, present in many ideologies. 
The Other, the Lacanian privileged signifier, the “phallus” 
representative of the Law, The-Name-of-the-Father, or power, is 
a privileged (Peircean) interpretant. But all signs can be put into 































displaced by Other pluralistic interpretants, provided we con-
tradict or make problematic any pre-given “either-or” totalizing 
predication. 
As Peirce, Freud, logicians and grammarians had already 
realized, much before Lacan, any signifying process or system 
requires at least the presence of three terms, in order to start 
producing meanings: 
a) a sign (or signifier), an object (or signified) of the sign, 
and an (evaluative)
     interpretant; 
b) unconscious sensations, conscious thoughts, and pre-
conscious mediating
     processes;
c) a subject, a predicate, and a copula;
d) a major term, a minor term, and a middle term;
e) a predicating ego, its other, and the mediating Other. 
It is worth noticing, however, that Lacan theories also reveal 
binaristic tendencies, for, among other significant reductionistic 
moves, he got rid of the interpretive preconscious system pos-
tulated by Freud.   
According to Freud (1986, p. 178-182), the unconscious 
system of the subject was basically a dynamic network of affec-
tive visual, tactile, acoustic, etc, memory-traces of things and 
events that the subject has been in contact with, traces which 
are capable of entering into condensation and displacement, the 
two primary “discursive” processes of that system. Unconscious 
representations are presented to our conscious system after being 
regulated by the preconscious system, which is responsible for 
both the “translation” and the simultaneous “censorship” of our 
unconscious articulations (SILVERMAN, 1983, p. 61). The 
primary processes of signification of our unconscious do not 
“respect” logical boundaries, constantly collapsing so called “nor-
mal”, rational symbolic oppositions between signs, preferring to 
be motivated instead by their material, affective and experiential 
relations of similarities and contiguities. 
Freud (1986, p. 178-182) saw the preconscious system as 
a “rational” network of interconnected symbol-presentations 
(or word-presentations as he called them), made up of sound-
images, motor speech-images, visual reading-images, motor 
reading-images, visual writing-images, motor writing-images, 
etc — that is, as a strict, disciplined network of learned patterns 
we need for communicating (in listening, speaking, reading, 
writing, etc). The preconscious system, still according to Freud, 
regulates and controls our unconscious wishes, submitting them 
to the civilizing constraints of our sociocultural formation. The 































binding of those affective traces of our unconscious with those 
regular communicational symbols, in their various verbal moda-
lities (graphic, acoustic, kinetic, etc), as well as the subjection of 
those affective/symbolic connections, or cathexes, to acceptable 
discursive patterns, as prescribed by conventional  relations of 
signification (based on identity/opposition relationships). In 
short, the preconscious system seems to be a “place” or “site” 
where affective/symbolic representations are articulated through 
conventional relations and syntactic operations which connect 
traces of sensorial signifiers with sociocultural signifying patterns. 
As Freud put it:
A word is thus a complex presentation consisting of the images 
enumerated above; or, to put it in another way, there correspon-
ds to the word a complicated associative process into which the 
elements of visual, acoustic and kinaesthetic origin enumerated 
above [signifying patterns or conventional communicational 
images] enter together.  A word, however, acquires its meaning 
by being linked to an “object-presentation”, in all cases, if we 
restrict ourselves to a consideration of substantives. The object-
presentation itself is once again a complex of associations made 
up of the greatest variety of visual, acoustic, tactile, kinaesthetic 
and other presentations [traces of sensorial signifiers]. Philosophy 
tell us that that an object-presentation consists in nothing more 
than this — that the appearance of there being a “thing” to whose 
various “attributes” [signifieds] these sense-impressions  [signifiers] 
bear witness is merely due to the fact that, in enumerating the 
sense-impressions which we have received from an object, we also 
assume the possibility of there being a large number of further 
impressions [additional interpretant signifiers] in the same chain of 
associations. The object-presentation [the sensorial signifier] is thus 
seen to be one which is not closed and almost one which cannot 
be closed, while the word-presentation [the classic, formal sign] is 
seen to be something closed, even though capable of extension. 
(FREUD,  1986, p. 182, my italics)
According to Freud, thus,  the unconscious system can only 
communicate indirectly with the conscious system, by linking 
some of its repressed, affective mnemonic traces (“thing-presenta-
tions” or “object-presentations” or sensorial signifiers), produced 
by past as well as incoming stimuli (of a visual, acoustic, olfactory, 
tactile, gustatory nature), with conventional signifying patterns 
(Peircean symbols), of a graphic, verbal, gestural, kinaethic nature, 
“stored” in the intermediate preconscious system:  
[…] the conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the 
thing [signifier] plus the presentation of the  word [signified] belon-
ging to it, while the unconscious  presentation is the presentation 
of the thing alone. The system Ucs. [the unconscious] contains the 
thing-cathexes [mnemonic-traces or sensorial signifiers, charged 
with affective value] of the objects, the first and true object-
cathexes [historical, external objects invested with affective value 
by the subject]. The system Pcs. [the preconscious]  comes about 
by this thing-presentation being hypercathected through being 
linked with the word-presentations corresponding to it.” (FREUD, 
1986, p. 172, my italics)
Thus, according to Freud, we have two mental systems par-
ticipating in signification, one unconscious, to which we do not 































by emotionally relevant things or events with which the subject 
interacts and has interacted with in the past, and another one 
preconscious, to which we can gain access in general thinking, and 
which relates those traces with conventional signifying patterns 
or conventional symbols (of a verbal, visual, gestural, etc, nature 
— (see SILVERMAN, 1983, p. 54-55).  
The preconscious is thus an interpretant system which is so-
mehow closed but capable of extension, as Freud said above. That 
is, it is capable of being expanded and transformed. For we can 
and do change our habitual ways of thinking, behaving, writing, 
speaking, drawing, dancing, cooking, etc, along our lives. Thus, 
the preconscious system has to be a two-way gate-keeper system, 
constantly receiving feedback about the effect of our actions 
in the environment as well as being affected by it through our 
conscious system. It is a censor that can be made to change its 
mind, a translator which can be corrected, an interpreter which 
can be made to change perspectives. 
Thus, as Freud also perceived it, meaning is an effect of a pro-
duction, of a process, which correlates material, affective sensorial 
traces with conventional, memorized, habitual spatio-temporal 
patterns. That process, which cathexes or invests emotional 
value to any symbolic discourse of the subject, is motivated by 
unconscious wishes of the subject or, more precisely, by his/her 
subjective desires. The aim of our intellectual processes, thus, is 
not the satisfaction of undifferentiated physical appetite produ-
ced by biological instincts (Lacan’s “need”), but rather the the 
fulfilment of a permanent lack (Lacan’s “desire”) produced by our 
specific sociocultural condition, or subjectivity (SILVERMAN, 
1983, p. 56).    
Now, as Freud also remarked, negation is
[…] a way of taking cognizance of what is repressed; indeed it is 
already a lifting of the repression, though not, of course, an accep-
tance of what is repressed. We can see how in this the intellectual 
function is separated from the affective process...The outcome of 
this is a kind of intellectual acceptance of the repressed, while at 
the same time what is essential to the repression persists (FREUD, 
1984, p. 438). 
He also added that 
To negate something in a judgement is, at bottom, to say: ‘This is 
something which I should prefer to repress.’ A negative judgement 
is the intellectual substitute for repression. With the help of the 
symbol of negation [no, not, don”t, none], thinking frees itself 
from the restrictions of repression and enriches itself with material 
that is indispensable for its proper functioning” (FREUD, 1984, p. 
438-39, my italics).
 
In other words, through negation our preferred Other takes 
cognizance of several repressed Others. 































one Other, but several Others, which are kept under the control 
of a hegemonic but temporary and contradictory dominant 
Other, which constructs and tries to maintain a basic, coherent 
“personality” or “character” for our egos, by constantly repressing 
other equally possible, but disturbing, interpretant Others. Most 
convincing actors, for instance, have learned how to switch from 
one Other to an Other according to the role they play. I believe 
that designers, in the same way as actors, are more productive and 
creative in their practice when they too become flexible, entering 
in a critical dialogue with Others (rules, laws, conventions) and 
others (concrete subjects), by avoiding to follow prescribed, ste-
reotyped, unchangeable styles, formulas, and aesthetic principles, 
and instead discussing alternative viewpoints.     
Saussure’s semiology was not dialogical. Even though he 
postulated that in signification there are only differences without 
positive terms, he also said that as soon as there is a sign (a word, 
a name, a pattern, or an identity) there is also (a supposedly sta-
tic) automatic opposition between that sign and others. For, as 
he said, every sign opposes all the other signs in its (supposedly 
static) sign-system. 
Fixed identities and oppositions is the basic principle of signi-
fication, according to Saussurean semiology and his structuralist 
followers. A principle which inspired most structuralists to search 
for static binary oppositions between homogeneous signs, in order 
to discover their underlying semiotic static “system”. Which, when 
“discovered”, it is then rendered asymmetrical by the predicating 
semiologist or structuralist, who cannot help projecting his/her 
subjective preferences, informed by his/her historical sociocultural 
values, onto one or the other term of the dichotomies he/she has 
“discovered” in the system. 
What started as a search for relevant, discriminative sensorial 
features between signifiers, looking up for differences without po-
sitive terms, after a short while becomes positivized in the form of 
dogmatic sets of opposites or contraries, which later on produce 
asymmetric dualisms and power relations. So, the structuralist 
researcher is always already a dichotomized and asymmetric 
sign him/herself, due to the logocentrism which informs his/her 
thinking and his/her methods and his/her practices. 
Qualities are not intrinsic, immutable, or essential attributes 
of signals, but rather imputed to them by the predicating sub-
ject, in consequence of a routine, of a more or less stable way of 
seeing, behaving, thinking, etc constructed into his/her head by a 
certain external, dominant, interpretant Other. An Other which 
is ideo-logical, and which is constantly put into process/trial by 
the semiotic environment of the subject, where representations 































mocratic regimes of signification, we cannot avoid putting our 
Other in dialogue with Others.  
The dialogical subject of signification realizes that certain 
privileged relations between signifiers are not eternal, essential or 
intrinsically more valuable than others, but simply more or less 
socially relevant and appropriate to his/her and others material 
survival, well-being, and happiness. The dialogical, democratic 
subject further realizes he/she too can make new significations, 
instead of passively using habitual ones, whenever he/she allows 
other Others to participate in his/her signifying practices too. 
But such an openess of mind requires one to realize first the 
subconscious, naturalized, blocking powers of his/her dominant 
Other, living both in his/her own preconscious structurations as 
well as in concrete, external representations of reality circulated 
by others sharing the same Other.     
For instance, let us take a look at symbolic representations 
of traditional logic. Copi (1986) writes, in relation to those 
conventional circular diagramations used by books of logic, that 
they have to be taken seriously, because they
 
[...] constitute an iconic [basically emotional, according to Peirce] 
representation of the standard-form categorical [that is, dicho-
tomized] propositions, in which spatial inclusions and exclusions 
[that is, static identities and oppositions; my italics] correspond to 
the non-spatial [thus temporal, historical] inclusions and exclusions 
of classes. They not only provide an exceptionally clear method of 
notation [or representation], but also are the basis of the simplest 
and most direct method of testing the validity of categorical syllo-
gisms [that is, of passing ideo-logical judgements on subjects” 
arguments] [...] (COPI, 1986, p. 199).
         
Such diagrams represent for many people, in very graphic, 
“clear” terms, the way our so-called “rational thinking” works 
or ought to work, according an ancient ideo-logical Other. All 
graphic representations represent an Other in the last instance, 
turning our predications permanently visible and static, and 
they cannot be easily withdrawn or erased afterwards. They may 
persuade others of our arguments, but we should not forget that 
they also make our minds a prisoner of the represented Other. 
We might repress or forget a graphic representation, but only 
through much effort. 
That is why recorded representations, notations, written 
texts, graphic signs in general have so great a power over subjects 
and their lives. Their articulations continue producing effects 
for a long time, independently of the wishes or desires of their 
“authors”. Effects which, unlike those of spoken articulations, 
cannot be immediately sensed, evaluated and counteracted, if 
necessary, by additional statements of the subject him/herself or 
by others. Representations, especially when printed, or presented 































On the other hand, subjects, consciously or not, are easily 
subjected to such “solid” representations, because they want to feel 
secure, projecting their imaginary selves on apparent certainties. 
Or, in others circumstances, they want to believe that, by having 
constructed a widely circulated and influential representation 
of some reality, they can be the Other, in perfect control of the 
actions and thoughts of themselves and many others.    
As Harvey (1989) sees it, in the architectural context, the 
role of representations in the construction of our subjective ex-
periences of space and time should not be taken lightly:
From..[a] materialistic perspective we can then argue that objective 
conceptions of time and space are necessarily created through 
material practices and processes which serve to reproduce social 
life. The Plain Indians or the African Nuer objectify qualities of time 
and space that are as separate from each other as they are distant 
from those ingrained within a capitalist mode of production. The 
objectivity of time and space is given in each case by the material 
practices of social reproduction, and to the degree that these 
latter vary geographically and historically, so we find that social 
time and social space are differently constructed. Each distinctive 
mode of production or social formation will, in short, embody a 
distinctive bundle of time and space practices and concepts.  Since 
capitalism has been (and continues to be) a revolutionary mode of 
production in which the material practices and processes of social 
reproduction are always changing, it follows that the objective 
qualities as well as the meanings of space and time also change. 
On the other hand, if advance of knowledge (scientific, technical, 
administrative, bureaucratic, and rational) is vital to the progress of 
capitalist production and consumption, then changes in our con-
ceptual apparatus (including representations of space and time) can 
have material consequences for the ordinary of daily life. When, for 
example, a planner-architect like Le Corbusier, or an administrator 
like Haussman, creates a built environment in which the tyranny 
of the straight line predominates, then we must perforce adjust 
our daily practices.” (HARVEY, 1989, p. 204) 
      
Thus, signification is a practice of making, disseminating, and 
submitting subjects” bodies to specific material representations, 
and not just a formal play with graphic marks, words, volumes, 
or abstract neutral concepts. Material form-ations do not follow 
functions, but rather construct, produce material effects. Material 
practices in-form, con-form, dis-in-form as well as trans-form 
and re-form subjects. And vice versa: for without predicating 
subjects, human agents, there is no signification, thus no material 
forms in the making nor effects being produced either. Concrete, 
syntactic formations, carried out by processes and practices of 
signification, and the effects they produce on subjects, are always 
interdependent, and such a triad, as any other triad, is reversible 
and without privileged, fixed positions or orientations. We use 
signs as much as signs use us. We design representations as much 
as representations design us. And formations and their effects also 

































This article has on purpose to discuss the necessity of laying back 
the fighting between disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, as if 
they were in an irreconcilable opposition. We try to demonstrate 
that wealth of Human Sciences increases by an open confront 
between these two research’s modalities in order to fulfill each 
other blanks. By means of this analysis, we give a new meaning 
for the terms superficiality and depth, trying to overcome the 
ancient opposition that considers the depth as a good thing in 
opposition to the superficial character. By doing that, we are 
reviewing, helped by Carlo Ginsburg’s theory, the opposition 
between rhetoric an proof, or, in other terms, between factuality 
and argumentative demonstration. Through the confrontation 
of disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity limits, we try to point new 
scientific directions, showing solutions capable on stimulating a 
frequent paradigmatic revision on sciences.
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Singificación y Diseño
RESUMEN 
El significado es una práctica social de construcción de sentido 
que implica la producción de las divisiones de semántica o 
signos (signum facere), que surgen de las diferencias construi-
das artificialmente por los predicadores de los temas de cada 
contexto cultural. Para el diseñador adecuar las soluciones a 
su medio social, el tiene que rechazar gran parte de lo que se 
conoce, los locales-priorísticas, fija dicotomizadas y definiciones 
reduccionistas, para que pueda pensar creativamente sobre sus 
problemas concretos. Soluciones innovadoras que no siguen la 
filosofía de la exclusión de esto y aquello, pero abarcan la inclu-
sión de esto y aquello, lo que explica la proximidad del diseño 
post-moderno en la semiótica de Peirce, que este estudio tiene 
como objetivo mostrar.
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